An open question about overtrained priors, the tryptophan–serotonin system, and — for the length of one thought experiment — Viktor Orbán's microtubules. A discussion-starter, not a study.
What happens to a person who, for thirty-five years, interprets every situation through a single class of priors — "everything is a battle, everyone an opponent"? Psychology has an answer. Neurochemistry has an answer. And if Penrose is even partly right, the quantum microtubules may have something to say as well. What, exactly, is the discussion this article intends to start.
Ha ezt a bekezdést gond nélkül elolvassa, Önnek nem ez a kiadás kell: az eredeti a tanul.io/kvantum címen várja. A cikk egyébként a két nyelvben szuperpozícióban létezett, amíg Ön ide nem kattintott; a mérést sajnos már nem lehet visszacsinálni.
P.S. This essay existed in two languages at once until it was observed. You have just performed the measurement. The Guide apologises for any decoherence.
One Wednesday afternoon — a familiar structure on this site — the following thought crept in. A person who spends thirty-five years in an adversarial role — a war correspondent, a chief prosecutor, a commando officer, or a prime minister in power for a generation — ends up with a brain of a very specific shape.
This does not make bad people. It makes specific brains.
The shape of a brain — as an earlier article here put it — is a learned, repeated pattern. According to predictive coding, the brain does not wait for the input: it predicts what will happen, and updates only when it was wrong. The basis of the prediction is the prior: the standing assumption about what to expect.
For 99% of life, the prior serves beautifully. The trouble breaks loose when life is 100% arranged so that only one kind of prior can form — because then the prior stops being a prior. Then it is identity.
What is a "prior"? An internal distribution over what we expect. If we drink coffee every morning, then in a familiar kitchen the "something hot and brown" prior dominates — before we have looked inside the cup. A well-calibrated prior permits fast decisions.
Except a prior is not intuition. A prior is an engraving. And there is a point past which the prior no longer serves us — we serve it. Psychology calls this rigidity, co-occurrence bias, cognitive freezing. In the language of neurobiology: the network encodes one state too densely, and warps every incoming stimulus toward that anchor.
The classic examples: the war correspondent who worked the front for thirty-five years, comes home, and gets an adrenaline spike at the sight of a table knife. The chief prosecutor who retires and, at every unfamiliar car, wonders who is running the surveillance. The boxer who spent fifteen years leading with his head, and at fifty can no longer sit calmly in a café.
These are not bad people. They are doing precisely what thirty years conditioned them to do. Only the curriculum has expired. (Also a familiar sentence on this site.)
And now for the delicate part.
Take a man who has been a reigning political leader for thirty-five years. Who has been in a continuously adversarial position since 1988 — since his student days at the technical university and the Bibó College. Who built his career so that every interview is a fight, every negotiation a trap, every EU summit a match, every neighbouring state a potential threat. Who addresses supporters and rivals alike in a permanent idiom of movement and war.
Viktor Orbán: founder of Fidesz at the Bibó István College of law students in 1988, prime minister of Hungary 1998–2002 and 2010–2026 — the "sixteen years" that recur throughout this series (see the founding entry). What matters for this essay is not the résumé but its shape: thirty-five uninterrupted years of adversarial framing, from dissident to incumbent, with the enemy rotating and the grammar constant. The Guide stresses, as does the author, that what follows is an argument about training data, not about souls.
What follows is not a political evaluation. What follows is a neurological observation.
Over thirty-five years, such a brain overtrains a single prior class: it warps every new situation toward the eigenvector of "battle". An EU grant, a minor coalition bargain — events that are approximately neutral — no longer arrive at the interpretive layer as neutral. They land on a threat lattice. The system generates a "battle response" reflexively — before consciousness has decided what is even happening.
This, too, is not a moral question. It is a network configuration. Another person, after thirty-five years in a different role — say, thirty-five years as a large, gentle kindergarten teacher — overtrains, by exactly the same mechanism, a soft, caregiving prior class. Her brain is just as locked in. Only the anchor differs, and the output.
Yet a large part of the explanation lives down there.
Here comes the biochemistry.
The neurotransmitter serotonin is synthesised from an amino acid called tryptophan. Tryptophan enters the body through food and, in the normal case, crosses the blood–brain barrier and becomes serotonin. Serotonin plays a key role not only in mood but in threat interpretation, social cognition, and risk assessment.
Now the hard part. Under chronic stress, chronic low-grade inflammation, or a chronic "threat mode", tryptophan's metabolic routing switches: the body diverts most of it down the kynurenine pathway instead of the serotonin pathway. The kynurenine pathway produces several neurotoxic metabolites (quinolinic acid, 3-hydroxykynurenine), and serotonin synthesis drops.
In other words: if someone's network operates in threat mode for thirty-five years, the tryptophan allocation keeps shifting from serotonin toward kynurenine. The system locks into threat mode biochemically. Not because anyone decided it should. Because that is how the metabolism rearranges itself.
This is where the article gets strange.
In 1996, the mathematician Roger Penrose and the anaesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff proposed a peculiar hypothesis they named orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR). In short: consciousness is not the product of ordinary classical electrical signals; instead, quantum-coherent states periodically collapse in the microtubules of neurons — and these collapses produce the moments of conscious experience.
In mainstream neuroscience this hypothesis is controversial — many would say not even "plausible". The warm, crowded, jostling environment of the brain should, in principle, tear apart any quantum coherence almost instantly, which contradicts the cold, isolated conditions coherence normally requires. Since the 2010s there have been a few interesting new measurements (Anirban Bandyopadhyay), but consensus is nowhere near.
But — and here is the actual question — suppose, for the length of one thought experiment, that Penrose is partly right. Suppose microtubule-level quantum states really do contribute something to the fine structure of cognition. And suppose that the tryptophan–serotonin–kynurenine system, exhausted in the long-reigning adversarial network described above, creates a biochemical environment that consistently pushes whatever residual quantum coherence there is toward one particular eigenstate.
Is it possible that in a person who has extremely overtrained a single prior class for thirty-five years, even the microtubule-level collapse of quantum coherence shifts consistently toward one particular eigenvector?
More simply: do overtrained priors freeze at the quantum level too?
There is no answer to this. Nobody knows. Testing it would require techniques that have not been invented. And for the question's purposes, the point is not the answer — the point is that it gets asked.
And yes, this is a ridiculous question. Scientifically serious and vaudevillian at once. That is the lovable nature of this site's discussion-starters: deep truths and outrageous, absurd hypotheses meet on exactly the same floor, holding hands. The serious core: an overtrained prior goes very deep into the nervous system. The vaudeville: how deep, nobody currently knows.
So what do we ask at the end? A three-level question.
This is a discussion-starter. The comments are open — I am especially curious about readers who think the Penrose–Hameroff hypothesis is nonsense. That case can be argued. And whoever says such a frame should never be applied to one specific politician — they have a point too.
The question remains the question nonetheless.
That is all for now. The comments await below.